The Future of Electronic Warfare

From House Armed Services Committee Roles and Missions Report:

THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are forcing our services to adapt to new asymmetric threats in new urban environments that require a higher level of jointness and inter-service cooperation. In these new environments the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, or more importantly the ability to obtain dominance of that spectrum, has quickly emerged as an essential tactical capability.

Dominating the spectrum through Electronic Warfare (EW) in recent years has been centered on the EA-6B Prowler squadrons of the Navy and Marine Corps (and soon to be Navy Growler Squadrons), and our military’s primary communications jamming aircraft, the Air Force EC-130H Compass Call. The Prowler’s ability to engage in electronic attack, electronic support, and electronic protection in support of our strike packages has earned the Prowler the status of a Go-No-Go asset. If a Prowler isn’t with an air squadron, the squadron doesn’t go. Additionally, both Prowlers and the Compass Call platform have stepped out of their traditional responsibilities to play key supporting roles in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

Through the heroic work of these EW communities in OIF and OEF it has become apparent that the need for EW capability has grown beyond the air and on to the ground as we have faced new threats such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). This need has reinforced the importance of developing and maintaining joint EW capability, forced other services to step up to the plate, and raised serious questions about the sustainability and endurance of the EW community in the future.

Joint EW Capability:

In the new environment EW has emerged as a key capability that has both saved lives and defeated the enemy. However, in order to succeed the EW community had to rapidly adapt new tactics and operate outside of its standard mission areas. This adaptation primarily occurred at the operational level where the military quickly realized that successful EW operations and tactics required an ability to climb out of traditional missions and to break traditional service stovepipes.

It is essential that EW is seen at all levels as a core mission area of the Department of Defense that will continue to be important in the future. The recent lessons learned in combat theaters must be extended from the operational level to the policy and programming level at the Pentagon. As commanders on the ground adapt their EW capabilities to the threat, the planners at the Pentagon still do not seem to understand the value of joint EW, or maintaining capabilities across this entire mission area. As services such as the Army begin to ramp up core EW capability again, there is little assurance that EW will remain a core, sustained capability supported jointly by the services.

Other Services:

It has been the Navy and Marine Corps, and within those services primarily their Prowler communities, that have stepped up to the plate to identify new capabilities and to train the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. While this has put significant strain on the EW community, the Army is doing its part by initiating its own EW core competency effort.

A target date of March 2008 has been set by the Army to replace Navy Electronic Warfare Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan and assume the primary ground EW mission. This represents a reacquiring of EW capability within the Army that had previously atrophied, reminding us of the importance of maintaining a balanced mix of complementary capabilities and skill sets across the services.

Sustaining EW Capability:

While the commanders on the ground in OEF and OIF quickly realized the value of sustaining joint capabilities in the EW mission area, serious questions remain about the Pentagon’s commitment at the policy and planning level.

The short history of the Air Force’s B-52 Stand-Off Jammer program provides a case study on how important mission areas that cut across the services are often not well coordinated. In 2002, the Department of Defense published an Analysis of Alternatives for Airborne Electronic Attack. It identified a mix of capabilities necessary to meet the Department’s airborne EW needs after 2009 when the Department’s Prowler fleet begins to retire. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement outlining their respective contributions to fulfilling this mission, and in November 2003, the Air Force formally embraced a return to the EW mission when Air Combat Command issued a concept of operations for Airborne Electronic Attack defining the Air Force role. In October 2004, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved an Initial Capabilities Document, “Denying Enemy Awareness Through Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA),” defining requirements for an Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) System of Systems.

To fulfill its role, the Air Force designed a program to add a jamming capability to the venerable B-52 bomber, and initiated a B-52 Stand-off Jammer (SOJ) program beginning with FY05. The original plan was to take an existing jamming pod and integrate it onto the B-52’s airframe, however, the Air Force soon discovered that this arrangement would not provide the power required to satisfy many requirements incorporated into the program. Costs ballooned well in excess of the Air Force’s programmed budget, reportedly by as much as $6 billion. The program was terminated in the FY07 budget and a new study initiated. The Air Force is currently pursing a concept for a Core Component Jammer (CCJ) capability on an as yet unidentified platform. The cost of this program is reportedly expected to be about $3 billion, but has yet to become a program of record.

Because of these set backs, the earliest we can expect to see an operational CCJ platform is 2015-2017. This creates a capability gap beginning in 2012, when the Air Force had committed to begin performing part of the airborne EW missions under the memorandum of agreement signed with the other services.

The Air Force must also address emerging shortfalls and readiness concerns in the Compass Call program. The aircraft has the highest utilization rate of any C-130 aircraft and it is approaching 20,000 hours of service in OIF and OEF alone. The 14 Compass Call aircraft in the fleet are aging and rely on decades-old technology that is rapidly becoming obsolete. While it achieved initial operational capability in 1983, the airframe is 35 years old and much of the technology dates back to the 1960s. If the Compass Call is expected to play an important role in joint EW for the next 10-15 years, it is important that the Air Force dedicate necessary funding to sustain the airframe and upgrading its mission and operating systems.

Increased focus within DOD on the joint EW mission area is needed to avoid these situations. The Air Force needs to step up with its role and commit to an AEA solution, but more oversight from Pentagon planners is required to support and enforce joint requirements in critical mission areas. The Pentagon needs to create a joint structure capable of ensuring that we don’t end up, once again, in a situation where EW expertise is in demand but the expertise is largely confined to one community.

Access full report at http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/HASCRolesandMissionsPanelReport.pdf
Access press release at http://armedservices.house.gov/list/press/armedsvc_dem/RMrelease030708.shtml